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Abstract: 
 
This paper highlights distinctive features of a neglected class of economic activity in the domain of 
medical innovation, namely the creation of testing regimes in clinical trials, asking how their nature might 
be expected to affect innovation of medical technology. It argues firstly that clinical trials are not simply 
about passively validating an already well-known technology and verifying its safety. Rather, clinical 
trials are part of a more active process of learning that allows pharmaceutical innovations to be useful 
outside the laboratory. It argues secondly that product development can proceed along a number of long 
and costly paths before a product’s behaviour in actual practice becomes clear, which can make selecting 
between alternative courses of action difficult. Thus, product choice and product development need to go 
hand-in-hand. To consider these arguments, the paper maps out four trajectories of polio vaccine 
development, tracing their paths through clinical trials since the 1950s, and describes some of the defining 
features of testing regimes for medical innovation. These include institutions that integrate knowledge and 
co-ordinate skills in testing processes, and capabilities for allocating testing resources, managing 
testability constraints, sharing knowledge and improving commensurability between testing communities. 
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1 Vaccine innovation and research translation: What are the needed 
institutions? 
 
Epidemics periodically emerge as policy priorities, prompting calls for new vaccines (for example avian 
influenza, HIV, Ebola). Policy discussion often focuses on how firms can be given exemptions from 
regulatory barriers so that candidates can be rushed through clinical trials and certified for the market, 
especially when framed as international emergencies. This assumes a rather limited role for the range of 
institutions engaged in medical innovation outside of the laboratory, wherein clinical trials might even be 
seen as a mere regulatory hurdle that is imposed on firms before certifying products as being safe for the 
market. Vaccine innovation is often characterised as a process where research is not only translated into a 
product, but it is one that can be accelerated if only the social validation and bureaucracy of clinical trials 
can be streamlined. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to a neglected area of innovation study, namely the creation 
of testing regimes in clinical trials, asking how their nature might be expected to affect innovation of 
vaccines and perhaps also other medical technologies such as pharmaceutical drugs and devices. The 
paper describes some of the defining features of testing regimes by drawing together ideas from studies of 
innovation, evolutionary economics, and sociology of science and technology. Pharmaceuticals are 
becoming increasingly difficult to develop (Hopkins et al. 2007; Scannell et al 2012; Gittleman 2016). 
They exhibit high levels of attrition and few candidates make it to the costlier clinical phases (Arrowsmith 
2013). The few that do make it to clinical trials are seen as candidates that await confirmation of whether 
or not they are safe and effective. This understates the extent to which many of these candidates are 
unfinished products when they reach clinical trials and undergo considerable further development in a 
testing regime in order to become safe and effective. This paper shows that testing regimes are expensive 
to set up and maintain, and entail the creation of both physical and non-physical ‘knowledge’ 
infrastructure. 
 
The paper makes two claims. First, clinical trials (i.e. testing that takes place in humans) are not simply 
about passively validating an already well-known technology and verifying its safety. Rather, clinical 
trials are part of a more active process of learning that allows pharmaceutical innovations to be useful 
outside the laboratory. Vaccines provide an extreme context to test this claim. Unlike most other medical 
technology vaccines are usually intended for people who are already healthy, which heightens concern for 
safety. There is special concern for product development to take place well in advance of clinical phases. 
  3 
Yet, even in vaccine innovation where safety is the paramount regulatory and social concern – to many it 
is the only concern (see Yaqub et al 2014) – we shall see that the search for efficacy extends well into the 
clinical phases and how, over the course of the vaccine’s ‘career’ (Blume 1992; Hopkins 2006), the 
learning process becomes more governance intensive in the clinical phases (for a direct comparison to 
learning in pre-clinical stages, see Yaqub and Nightingale 2012). If science does not lead to a clear and 
costless path to technology then, even in a case like vaccines, there is a need to understand what else is 
needed for product development, and what activities are going on under the banner of clinical trials and 
regulation. 
 
Second, within a vaccine’s career, multiple trajectories can be pursued (Dosi 1982; von Tunzelmann et al. 
2008; Rip 2012). Although possible trajectories may become apparent by learning in laboratories and 
animals, the overall performance characteristics of the different trajectories operating in different systems 
will not have been revealed in their entirety. Product development can proceed along a number of long 
and costly paths before a product’s behaviour in actual practice becomes clear, which can make selecting 
between alternative courses of action difficult.1 Thus, product choice and product development need to go 
hand-in-hand. 
 
The paper will substantiate these two claims through historical case study. Below, I develop a framework 
for analysing the case study by defining salient features of testing regimes. The paper contributes directly 
to a stream of literature concerning the evolution of medical knowledge (Gelijns and Rosenberg 1994; 
Mina, et al. 2007; Rosenberg 2009; Nelson et al 2011; Consoli et al 2016). It also draws on history of 
technology and engineering studies literature concerning the accumulation of technological knowledge 
(Layton 1974; Constant 1980; Vincenti 1990, Rosenberg and Steinmueller 2013), and specific work 
indicating that the rate and direction of vaccine innovation is influenced by the ability to set up ‘testing 
regimes’ and test repeatedly (Nelson 2008; Yaqub 2010; Yaqub and Nightingale 2012). The intuition here 
is that all complex technologies share a protracted process of development, be they vaccines or turbojets.2 
 
                                                 
1 The costs of achieving greater clarity about alternatives can be significant: ‘Development expenditures accounted 
for approximately 67% of total R&D spending. These figures, at the very least, suggest great skepticism about the 
view that the state of scientific knowledge at any time illuminates a wide range of alternative techniques from which 
the firm may make cost-less, off-the-shelf selections’ (Rosenberg 1994:13). Rosenberg identified this, choosing 
between alternatives, as being ‘what economic analysis is all about’. 
2 However, as mentioned already and as will be explored empirically, an important characteristic that distinguishes 
medical technology from other complex technology is that safety considerations permeate this process in its entirety. 
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2 Testability, trajectories and infrastructure: a framework for analysis 
 
Technologists test ideas with instruments and skill under varying conditions, according to shared 
standards, and with the active participation of co-ordinating institutions. I refer to this triad of elements 
(conditions, instruments, and institutions) as a testing regime. We will see in the empirical section how 
the resulting testability of trajectories can differ with significant social consequences (in terms of the 
characteristics of the vaccines we end up with and the infrastructure organised around them). 
 
Testing regimes do not proceed aimlessly, they require a ‘social vision’ set out by technical and 
practitioner communities as well as broader communities (Blume 1992:64-70). This is because 
technologies have a purpose that is not completely inherent to their physical properties (Polanyi 
1958:328). Purpose and function combine to form ideas for operational principles (how a technology 
works) (Vincenti 1990:209), and social visions are formed around which operational principles can 
accelerate and develop as a trajectory within a vaccine’s career, often in plurality because theory is a 
weak guide to practice (Blume 1992; Yaqub 2010).3 
 
Testing of operational principles proceeds through experimental stepping-stones, by building up 
understanding in simplified animal models before more realistic testing is undertaken in humans (Yaqub 
and Nightingale 2012). Testing conditions are therefore controlled to trade-off ease of learning 
(simplicity) against clinical relevance (complexity). Instrumentalities (Price 1984a, 1984b) – interpreted 
in this paper as physical devices, equipment and instruments, together with the skills to use them4 – allow 
testing conditions to be adjusted. 
 
Technological practice draws on science in specific and limited ways that centre on the creation of testing 
conditions. Instrumentalities can benefit learning processes in two opposing ‘directions of fit’ 
(Nightingale 2014:5-8). In learning for science, instrumentalities help to control conditions which are not 
often repeated or replicated5 but need to be highly simplified for identifying patterns and causal 
explanations (Hacking 1983; Deutsch 1997). In learning for technology, instrumentalities help to control 
                                                 
3 A more explicit insight into how social visions interact with technological developments can be found in the 
relationship between diagnosis (Rosenberg 2002), diagnostic instruments and the establishment of disease causation 
(pathology) (see Yaqub 2010). Before vaccine development efforts can take flight, there are some critical elements – 
namely, a disease and an associated pathogen, and a diagnosis capable of characterising both reliably. 
4 These skills include the development of routines, heuristics, techniques, know-how (as opposed to only know-
what), highly specific practices and procedures, experience of what tends to work and what does not (Nelson and 
Winter 1982; Pavitt 1999). 
5 Scientists rarely replicate or repeat experiments, they more often seek to improve and set precedents (Hull 1988). 
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conditions, where causal explanations are less important6, but creating new effects and ways of replicating 
them reliably in more complex environments becomes prime. Such perspectives can be applied to medical 
innovation, where clinical knowledge is argued to be significantly independent from advances in 
scientific understanding; this has been referred to as an important ‘point of discontinuity with the 
traditional literature on health technology diffusion’ (Consoli and Ramlogan 2012:315). 
 
Two styles of testing can be used when manipulating testing conditions (Yaqub and Nightingale 2012). 
Passive ‘testing as validation’ involves testing whether similar problems have similar solutions. This can 
be largely non-theoretical because it is not necessary to know how a technology works in order to know 
that it does work (Nightingale 2004:1271). However, it offers little guidance about what to do if tests fail. 
In such cases, rather than a cycle of conjecture and refutation, active ‘testing as experimental 
intervention’ is used to build artificial experimental conditions that create new phenomena to allow 
theoretical learning (Hacking 1983). 
 
Since new effects are being created, local variations in practice and instruments can make establishing 
their reliability difficult: conditions or standards between tests may be too different to be able to observe 
empirical regularities; accuracy and relevance of observations may be checked with different instruments. 
More importantly, it can mean that comparison with other effects (new or otherwise) is not possible. With 
low comparability, the interpretation of testing data in order to eliminate less suitable trajectories becomes 
subject to intense social negotiation as interests form around particular trajectories. In the case study, we 
will see how governance structures can either co-ordinate various activities and instruments to increase 
comparability across conditions or it can provide leadership that mediates arguments about how the 
instruments are calibrated and the criteria for success or failure. 
 
Co-ordination between research and development groups is needed in the form of ‘invisible 
infrastructure’7 in order to ensure the new knowledge arising from testing processes is accumulated. In the 
case study, we will see how biomarkers - correlates of immunity - help guide the direction of trajectories 
(Eichler et al. 2008:819). These allow developers to turn subjective qualitative desires into objective 
quantitative specifications and design goals that can be tested for in progressively less simplified 
conditions (Vincenti 1988). We will also see the development of knowledge indexes or taxonomies 
where, for example, disease symptoms can be categorised or immune responses can be ranked. This 
                                                 
6 ‘Technology can exist as an autonomous body of knowledge because it is possible to know how to produce effects 
without knowing how those effects are produced’ (Nightingale 2004:1271, original emphasis). 
7 Building on Nightingale’s (2004) use of the term, it refers to non-tangible infrastructure needed for knowledge 
accumulation. 
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allows for agreement and shared judgement to form over technical feasibility in learning and testing 
processes. Such examples of ‘invisible infrastructure’ have important public good characteristics for the 
activity of multiple research groups and do not develop autonomously alongside technological 
opportunities. They are a shared utility, created at high fixed cost, and need governance to set up and 
maintain. 
 
This process can offer multiple options for product development, but they do not necessarily remain open 
permanently. As technical systems themselves undergo change, certain options can become harder to 
develop, or can even be locked out altogether (David 1985; Stirling 2008; Rip 2012). So, certain choices 
cannot be made too early before products are sufficiently developed and before the option is conceivable, 
nor can they be made too late when the surrounding infrastructure no longer viably supports the option. 
 
To illustrate these features of knowledge accumulation are present even in the clinical trial stages of 
product development, I follow Blume’s (2005) and Chataway et al.’s (2010) approach of illustrative case 
studies in vaccine innovation. My research design takes the historical career of poliomyelitis vaccine as 
its empirical focus. To increase within-case validity I use four trajectories, one of which is counter-
theoretical where a key element in the theory (supporting technical infrastructure) is absent and the 
nascent trajectory no longer remains a viable option. The history has been reconstructed on the basis of 
data that draws on a range of documentary sources, including practitioners’ accounts, scientific reviews 
and journals, biographies, policy reports, newspaper articles, and publications by NGOs such as advocacy 
groups, charities and foundations. The data was collected as part of a large multi-year study on vaccine 
innovation (Yaqub 2010). Taken in isolation, many of these sources purport to document the actions of 
great men and famed organisations (like like Jonas Salk and the March of Dimes). However, a 
theoretically-informed secondary synthesis reveals a knowledge accumulation process at work that 
persists beyond the heroism of a single agent or organisation, spanning multiple actors and organisations. 
 
3 Mapping technological trajectories in polio vaccine development 
 
3.1 Context for clinical polio vaccine development 
 
When Landsteiner and Popper showed poliomyelitis was spread by an infectious agent in 1908, and when 
Franklin Roosevelt was struck by poliomyelitis in 1921, the development of a social vision for a vaccine 
was set in motion (Yaqub and Nightingale 2012). After fatal testing failures in the 1930s, a new testing 
regime was developed in 1947: new testing conditions provided by a plentiful and steady supply of 
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monkeys; new instrumentalities such as tissue-culturing techniques that tightened feedback loops for 
experimental learning, and new institutional efforts included a co-ordinated large-scale poliovirus typing 
project (Yaqub and Nightingale 2012). 
 
By 1953, poliomyelitis afflicted more than 20 per 100,000 in the US (Robbins 2004:17). Emphasis shifted 
to creating testing conditions in humans and transitioning to clinical vaccine development. Tom Rivers, 
who headed the research committee in the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis, put out a call, “It is 
time that we got ready to go somewhere, and somebody ought to come up with some concrete 
experiments that will be done in human beings on a small scale in order to get going” (Carter 1965:126). 
 
With the chances of making a poliomyelitis vaccine much improved, and an urgent social imperative, a 
number of groups worked with different operational principles that were to become the bases for different 
technological trajectories. Hammon chose to pursue a passive immunisation approach, whilst Salk and 
Sabin successfully pursued active immunisation approaches.8 
3.2 Passive immunisation: Testing for design and field-based capabilities 
 
As noted in theory, a critical part of the vaccine design process can be described as a difficult and 
uncertain transformation of qualitative goals into objective ones. I begin by outlining the feasibility of 
passive immunisation as an operational principle, before analysing considerations made about vaccine 
design and organisational capabilities during the move to human testing. 
 
As an operational principle, Hammon believed that γ-globulin, an antibody obtained from pooled plasma 
with known neutralising activity in the laboratory, might offer benefits in practice. Rather than prevent 
poliovirus infection, his immediate goal was to prevent disease on the nervous system caused by the 
infection (Carter 1965; Paul 1971; Plotkin and Vidor 2004). Permanent immunity through repeated 
infection might be achieved, but without the symptoms of poliomyelitis. The idea carried weight in part 
because passive administration of serum achieved some success against measles virus (MRC 1948). 
 
In 1948 Morgan and Bodian were able to protect monkeys from one type of poliomyelitis (Carter 
1965:64; Paul 1971:405). By using graded doses of virus, which produced varying levels of antibody, 
they produced different degrees of immunity in monkeys. This represented an improvement in invisible 
infrastructure because antibody experiments conducted by different research groups could be compared to 
                                                 
8 Passive immunisation refers to the transfer of virus-specific antibodies. Active immunisation refers to the transfer 
of an altered form of the virus that induces virus-specific antibodies. 
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a shared index of immunity in monkeys. Researchers knew how much antibody would create weak 
immunity in monkeys (against small doses of virus) and how much antibody would create strong 
immunity (against high doses of virus). Hammon wanted to develop a similar index for humans so that 
one could make a safe start to ascertaining ‘how much was enough for humans?’ and ‘how long do they 
last in the blood?’. 
 
The Foundation created a ‘Committee on Immunization’ to manage strategic and logistic aspects of 
human vaccine trials (Carter 1965:125; Paul 1971:407). It was a daring role given the traumatic failures 
of the Brodie-Kolmer trials two decades earlier, where the deaths - testing as validation - did not offer 
much guidance about how to proceed (Yaqub and Nightingale 2012). Fear about using killed or live virus 
was a common theme, but Hammon’s vaccine did not contain any virus, only γ-globulin, a form of 
‘ready-made’ antibody. 
 
Hammon’s preliminary field trial showed that relatively low levels of antibody could prevent invasion of 
the central nervous system (Hammon et al. 1953). The results provided vaccine developers pursuing 
different trajectories, such as Salk and Sabin, not only with the confidence that disease could be 
prevented, but also a tangible performance criterion. The subjective aim of immunity had become an 
objective goal of putting antibodies in the blood. By helping to ascertain how much antibody was needed 
to prevent infection, Hammon effectively provided a correlate of immunity, a biomarker. The testing 
regime had a bar, against which potential designs could be compared. 
 
Questions of how quickly immunity could be established in the blood, and how long it would last for in 
the blood under various conditions remained. Hammon argued that with his γ-globulin, ‘its effect would 
be immediate and would represent no danger to any child’ (Hammon 1950:702). The mention of ‘no 
danger’ was a deliberate attempt to highlight that other vaccine trajectories were contemplating the 
inclusion of virus, whereas his did not. And whilst his vaccine did indeed serve immunity quickly, it was 
suspected to not last as long as antibodies produced by the body through active immunisation as proposed 
by the other trajectories. Hammon also argued the active immunisation trajectories needed multiple 
injections to establish their longer lasting immunity. Although passive immunisation might not need 
multiple injections, Hammon apparently overlooked the fact that his subsequent clinical trial would 
deplete reserves of γ-globulin.9 A further trial with more people - and hence more varied testing 
conditions - was needed to address these issues of speed, durability and quality of immunity.10 
                                                 
9 The limited availability of γ-globulin restricted its use. Obtaining γ-globulin was an expensive and time consuming 
process and depended on voluntary blood donations. At the same time, the Korean War and hospital needs were 
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The Foundation funded Hortsmann (1952) and Bodian (1952) to see if passive immunisation protected 
monkeys from very high, lethal doses of poliovirus of all three strains. Compared to Morgan’s experiment 
in 1948, these testing conditions were more technologically relevant (because they involved all three 
strains at high doses), and perhaps even scientifically less interesting (because the theoretical concept of 
neutralising antibodies had already been established). The protection achieved under these conditions 
convinced the panel to fund a pilot study of 5000 children. Panel members realised that this size would 
not yield statistically significant results, rather the study’s purpose was ‘to gain experience in organisation 
and administration, as well as to evaluate the public’s and medical profession’s reaction to such a trial’ 
(Rinaldo 2005:793). 
 
The details of the trial which needed to be organised were very broad.11 Most critical was ‘the definition 
of the severity of the paralytic disease, for which they used a carefully graded scale of muscle function 
loss’ (Rinaldo 2005:793). Similar to the virus typing project, and the antibody index, this is another 
example where the Foundation set up invisible infrastructure to compare future observations to a set of 
known conditions, thereby ensuring that those observations would contribute to the cumulative growth of 
technological knowledge. It might otherwise have been seen as a chore, with little, if any, scientific merit. 
 
The pilot results were encouraging and public support was very strong, with hundreds of volunteers being 
turned away by day four (Hammon et al. 1953). Problems included such issues as lack of access to 
autoclaves to sterilise the needles. A larger trial was quickly approved, which involved 55,000 children. 
The result of this trial was considered, ‘conclusive evidence of a very significant reduction in the total 
number of cases of paralytic poliomyelitis’ (Hammon et al. 1953:758). 
 
The trajectory lost momentum as the Foundation turned its attention to Salk’s and Sabin’s vaccine 
candidates, perhaps taking the depletion of the γ-globulin as a serious impediment, or perhaps it was 
                                                                                                                                                             
drawing on supplies. O’Connor warned that there was not enough to provide ‘even temporary protection to the 46 
million children and adolescents most susceptible to poliomyelitis’ (Rinaldo 2005:795). Nevertheless, the 
Foundation spent $7m boosting γ-globulin production and a further million children were protected in the poliovirus 
season of 1953 (Rinaldo 2005). 
10 The Immunization Committee initially turned down Hammon’s request for a larger scale controlled trial (Rinaldo 
2005). They wanted to see more animal and human data before embarking on a complicated and expensive clinical 
trial (the trial ultimately cost the Foundation $1m). They were also concerned about using placebo controls, which 
had never been used before, and its moral and social acceptability (Rinaldo 2005). 
11 They included how to: blind the vaccine vials, select a type of control inoculum, source and set dosage of γ-
globulin, types of syringes, packaging, venue, injection administration site on the body, consider legal aspects such 
as written informed consent, select geographical areas undergoing epidemics of a suitable magnitude, gain approval 
by local population, manage publicity and preparation of clinics, and follow up studies to identify incidence cases. 
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hoped the other trajectories would provide longer-lasting and stronger protection. Note that the efforts of 
an earlier, awkward, quasi-failure trajectory can end up enabling subsequent more successful trajectories, 
in this case, through active governance to ensure shared learning. Hammon concluded that, ‘perhaps the 
greatest contribution of the γ-globulin trials… demonstrated that a very low concentration of antibodies 
will protect man’ (Hammon et al. 1953:1283). Aside from taking this design standard from monkeys and 
establishing a correlate of immunity in human conditions, a graded scale of paralytic disease was also 
developed with which to evaluate other trajectories – crucial invisible infrastructure. 
 
The trials were seized as an opportunity for the Foundation to build up organisational capabilities in 
acquiring local knowledge for testing outside laboratory conditions, and co-ordinating people, resources, 
logistics and public support. Alongside the accumulation of technological knowledge, the Foundation had 
begun setting up the infrastructure for moving potentially more dangerous vaccines to trial in humans, and 
for comparing between different trajectories. 
3.3 Killed vaccines: Testing regimes for taking ‘calculated risk’ 
 
This section discusses how a more risky vaccine was tested in humans despite the fact that the product 
being tested was considered unfinished and still under development - tests were designed not only to learn 
and improve on the product, but also to allow comparison between trajectories on a number of dimensions 
of performance, not least that of safety. This vaccine’s operational principle would be more risky than 
Hammon’s because it contained killed virus (rather than mere antibodies), but less risky than using live 
vaccine. There was no test to make certain all the vaccine’s virus was killed, so the decision to test in 
humans was a difficult one - the initial risk appears to have been borne by certain sections of society. As 
with Hammon, we will see efforts by Salk to lock in the trajectory, but we will also see the mechanisms 
put in place to mediate differences in opinion and maintain comparability between trajectories. 
 
By 1953, Salk had shown that poliovirus could be inactivated by formaldehyde, providing the basis for 
his operational principle and trajectory of development (Salk 1953). Moreover, he determined how much 
formalin affected inactivation, and conducted safety and immungenicity studies in animals (Benison 
1967; Robbins 2004). If there was any doubt as to whether Salk’s animal findings could be transferred to 
children, Howe’s (1952) paper made it clear, entitled ‘Antibody response of chimpanzees and human 
beings to formalin inactivated trivalent poliomyelitis vaccine’.12 Salk, too, had started preliminary studies 
                                                 
12 Howe tested six children at the Rosewood school, whom he noted as, ‘low-grade idiots or imbeciles’ (1952:265), 
and was able to report that ‘both children and chimpanzees develop readily demonstrable neutralising antibodies at 
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in humans which showed that antibodies could be increased to relatively high titres in children already 
infected at the Watson Home for Crippled Children.13 But these advances, aside from any modern-day 
ethical testing concerns, were leading to a somewhat problematic vaccine. 
 
Conventional wisdom held that a live-attenuated vaccine could confer longer-lasting immunity because it 
more closely mimicked a true infection (Carter 1965; Klein 1976; Smith 1990). Several of the 
Committee’s senior virologists, such as Albert Sabin and the Nobel Laureate John Enders, questioned the 
relevance of short-lived antibodies and doubted the safety of a vaccine prepared from virulent poliovirus, 
regardless of how thoroughly it was inactivated, especially after the failed vaccines of the 1930s (ibid). 
Enders is even quoted as having confronted Salk and calling his work, “quackery” (Carter 1965:88). But 
for Salk, the notion that only natural infection or a vaccine made of living pathogen could offer durable 
protection was nonsense. Governance structures were needed to increase comparability with the passive 
and live vaccine trajectories, and to provide leadership on what counts as success criteria. 
 
Members of the Foundation acknowledged ‘sharp differences’ in the Immunization Committee and tried 
to manage them (Paul 1971:407). For example, regarding concerns about whether an inactivated 
poliomyelitis vaccine really was inactivated, Rivers said at a Committee meeting, “I think we will all 
admit that there is no test to be sure the stuff is inactive. Why not just accept that? Why kid ourselves? 
Why use the word inactive? Why not just say, ‘safe for use?’ It won’t produce disease, and that’s all there 
is to it” (Carter 1965:126, my italics). 
 
Such ‘nervous brawling’ stalled any kind of progress (Carter 1965:129). So, in 1953, the Foundation set 
up a new and smaller committee because, as Weaver is quoted as saying, “The immunization committee 
was not able to function with the necessary dispatch. It could get entangled for months in technical 
debates. Furthermore, its members were virologists and the decisions on which we needed help were not 
exclusively virological. The Vaccine Advisory Committee with experienced public health men… was a 
far more efficient group” (Carter 1965:176; Paul 1971:411). The need for a second committee suggests 
that the design of tests is not an entirely objective and technical matter, and includes broader institutional 
considerations. It was also established in part to limit conflicts of interest that may arise from having 
competing designers playing the role of “architect, carpenter and building inspector” all at once (Weaver 
quoted in Carter 1965:179). 
                                                                                                                                                             
comparable levels following the injection of small quantities of clarified monkey cord suspensions containing 
formalin inactivated poliomyelitis virus’ (1952:265). 
13 Like Howe, Salk tested children who were not infected but were ‘mentally retarded’ and found that the levels of 
antibody production were equally encouraging (Chase 1982). 
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Salk recalls the arbitrary nature of deciding when and precisely what to test. “All we had were several 
dozen experimental preparations, some with adjuvant, some without, some containing one type of virus, 
some another or a third or all three, some made with monkey tissue, some with testes, some inactivated 
for ten days, some for thirteen, some for twenty one” (Carter 1965:130). Salk insisted, “I don’t know that 
we even have a vaccine yet. That term was used, but I think it should be understood that we are using it as 
a colloquial expression. We have preparations which have induced antibody formation in human subjects” 
(Carter 1965:152). The possible permutations of experimental conditions Salk describes seem endless. 
Salk was eventually pushed into readiness by the Foundation.14 
 
Although Rivers thought the Salk vaccine was ‘something slightly better than γ-globulin, something by 
definition imperfectible,’ he felt it was ‘worth a try’ (Carter 1965:152). Harry Weaver wrote, ‘The 
practice of medicine is based on a calculated risk… If [we wait until more] research is carried out, large 
numbers will develop poliomyelitis who might have been prevented from doing so… our work must be 
governed by scientific and sociological concerns’ (Carter 1965:147; Benison 1967).15 From these 
exchanges, it seems that vaccine development is not a process of optimisation. Vaccines are developed to 
function only sufficiently well enough to fulfil a social purpose. That purpose drove the Foundation to 
urgently begin planning for a major field trial. 
 
In the design of the trial, the planned use of placebo controls was problematic, but the precedent seemed 
necessary. Initially, Weaver sought simplicity and economy, and suggested that the poliomyelitis rate be 
compared between vaccinated and non-vaccinated school-children of the same age (Carter 1965:176). 
However, the Vaccine Advisory Committee suggested that socioeconomic differences between those who 
volunteered and those who did not would weaken the study.16 
 
                                                 
14 A member of the Vaccine Advisory Committee said, “Progress can be made even [when] we have so little 
knowledge… the time has come to really go at the inactivated material… The live virus is fine, but if you think 
about it as a public health measure, it is a difficult thing to use… I don’t think you have a good excuse morally to go 
into infectious material until we have shown that inactivated material was unsatisfactory” (Carter 1965:128). 
15 The trade-off was emphasised in a telegram to convince sceptics, ‘It is said that to await certainty is to await 
eternity’ (Smith 1990:295). 
16 A ‘good’ vaccine might go amiss. Less well-educated families living in poorer areas were less susceptible to 
poliomyelitis, tending to contract the non-paralytic form in infancy and gaining immunity. Moreover, they were less 
likely than high income, well-educated, families to submit their children to the trial. So, if the poliomyelitis rate in 
the vaccinated group ended up being similar to that among the unvaccinated, it might be because the trial only 
immunised the most susceptible children. This was a testability constraint, and a different design-technique would 
be needed for the test to have the necessary resolving power to prove its efficacy. 
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Salk felt that his vaccine was not up to such a stringent test, and lapses in the manufacturing process or 
unimpressive results of a double-blind test might scupper the opportunity to improve it (Carter 1965:178). 
I quote him at length in the paragraphs below to show that the design of the tests was at the centre of his 
concerns at the time, and that the parameters of the tests left an indelible mark on the nature and 
characteristics of the vaccine. 
 
“The sensible thing, I thought, was to accept the urgencies of the situation and continue 
improving the vaccine. I thought the field trial should be designed to permit this, not 
prevent it… I thought we should concentrate on polio prevention and be less concerned 
about making epidemiological history with an elegant double-blind study. I was afraid 
that, for some people, the kind of test had become more important than the kind of 
protection the vaccine might be able to provide.” 
 
“I wanted to know who had been vaccinated so that blood samples could be taken 
promptly. If tests then showed that a certain batch of vaccine was producing 
unsatisfactory results, the children could be revaccinated with better material. At the 
same time, we could be taking steps to improve the manufacturing process and avoid new 
batches of inferior vaccine. Finally I was uncomfortable about giving placebo shots to 
children, depriving them of immunity in what might turnout to be an epidemic year. 
Many public health officials agreed with me on this.” 
 
“You had this rigid insistence that a ‘product’ be submitted forthwith for ceremonious 
testing. The emphasis on ‘product’ and on ritual and on looking good in the eyes of 
certain elements in the scientific community was being allowed to obscure the real 
purpose of everyone’s work, which was the prevention of polio” (Carter 1965:178). 
 
The long quote illustrates Salk’s attempt to focus testing efforts on product development. He wanted 
clinical trials to accelerate only this trajectory, and limit direct comparison with other trajectories that had 
potential to be successful (namely that of Sabin’s). The Foundation needed to strike a balance between 
product development and product choice. 
 
In order to address the concerns of parents, teachers, and such ‘humanitarians’ O’Connor announced that 
an observed control plan would be used, in which children would not be injected but only observed 
(Meldrum 1998). The Foundation asked health officers for advice and support, who suggested that the 
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Foundation may not be able to maintain impartiality in such evaluation (Meldrum 1998). So O’Connor 
appointed Thomas Francis to head the evaluation of the trials, a critical but unglamorous task, based on 
‘his deft direction of complex field trials of influenza virus vaccines during World War II’ (Markel 
2005:1408). However, Francis would not accept until he manoeuvred between health officers, 
paediatricians, clinical poliomyelitis specialists, statisticians and virologists to engineer a change in the 
trial design to include placebos (Meldrum 1998). 
 
Addressing concerns about volunteer recruitment in the placebo plan, the evaluation group decided that it 
could rely on the widespread fear of the disease; members agreed that ‘it would not be difficult to sell as 
there is a high attack rate… [and] there would still be a 50% chance of a child receiving the vaccine’ 
(Meldrum 1998:1235). Francis compromised with Salk and others to a certain extent with observed 
design in some areas, but his insistence on the placebo plans in other areas was particularly important in 
the context of the vociferous criticisms from Enders, Sabin and others about the validity of the killed-
vaccine concept.17 
 
The trial for the vaccine went ahead in 1954 and was the largest of its kind to be run. It was not a cheap 
gamble, grants for the field trial and its evaluation cost the Foundation a total of $7.5m. The results of 
nearly 2 million children were presented on 12th April 1955, and the vaccine was found to be safe and 
70% effective, with breakthrough cases judged to be less severe (Smith 1990).18 With financial guarantees 
from the Foundation, industrial production facilities were already built and ready to operate (Blume and 
Geesink 2000). The Foundation paid a further $7.5m to the manufacturers for 10 million Salk vaccine 
doses (Chase 1982). The products of six producers were licensed within days and poliomyelitis cases 
dropped from 58,000 in 1952 to 5,600 in 1957. 
 
Paul, whose career in poliovirus research spanned both eras, contrasts the 1935 and 1955 vaccines, 
products of testing as validation and testing as experimental intervention respectively. ‘The situations 
were in no way comparable, for the Brodie-Kolmer vaccines had been launched in the face of colossal 
ignorance, whereas the Salk-type vaccine had been promoted under circumstances which from the start 
almost guaranteed success. And yet one cannot help feeling a twinge of sympathy for the two figures of 
1935 who were so alone in the midst of their disgrace, in contrast to the powerful forces of the National 
Foundation, the US Public Health Service, and innumerable advisory committees that stood back of the 
                                                 
17 The placebo plans were also part of the Foundation’s effort to legitimise an institution governed by non-experts. It 
was important given the possible conflict of interest arising from the Foundation evaluating a vaccine they, as an 
organisation, developed and sponsored. 
18 Cases where volunteers are diagnosed with poliomyelitis despite being vaccinated in the trial. 
  15 
Salk type vaccine’ (1971:420). Paul notes how different the testing regimes were and how the difference 
was critical for knowledge to accumulate. 
3.4 Live vaccines: testing in the shadow of the killed vaccine 
 
This section reviews how improvements to the testing regime enabled the establishment of live vaccine 
trajectory. It emphasises the historical-dependency of such trajectories by highlighting the role of non-
fiscal testing resources, and ultimately describes different decisions taken by public health authorities in 
the USSR and USA. Because the virus is live, the lack of a safety test becomes a major issue of 
testability. 
 
As he had done with the yellow fever virus, Max Theiler achieved attenuation by repeatedly infecting the 
brains of living mice with poliovirus until the virus no longer caused paralysis (but still retained its 
capacity to stimulate an immune response) (Chase 1982). He reported it to the Foundation in 1946, which 
then funded further research to see if poliovirus could also lose its ability to infect the central nervous 
system – which it did on repeated passage through non-nervous system tissues – to make this trajectory 
safer to pursue as an operational principle (Robbins 2004). 
 
The live attenuated poliomyelitis vaccine approach was feasible only after certain developments in the 
testing regime because the approach relied on striking a balance between efficacy and safety (Yaqub and 
Nightingale 2012). This entailed searching for virus that is not pathogenic (disease causing) but retains 
some of its virulence (ability to infect). The development of tissue culture techniques19 facilitated the 
rapid emergence of variation in strains, whilst the availability of monkey models allowed vaccine 
developers to select for pathogenicity and virulence traits20, and the typing project allowed putative 
vaccine preparations to be challenged without added confusion. 
 
                                                 
19 Viral culture techniques were significantly improved by Dulbecco and Vogt (1954). Adapting techniques for 
growing bacteria, they grew virus in microscopically thin mono-layers of chick embryo tissue cells. The colonies 
proliferating from the growth of a single viral particle could be identified, counted and isolated. This made it easier 
to purify specific lines of virus, which was extremely valuable for those looking to prepare a live vaccine (Paul 
1971:406; Robbins 2004:19). 
20 Selecting strains with monkeys meant that live vaccine development did not need to rely on few and imprecise in-
vitro markers of virulence, such as growth at higher temperature (Paul 1971:458). Instead, a more authoritative test 
for neurovirulence, adopted as the standard by the regulatory agencies, was devised where monkeys had to be 
inoculated through their central nervous system (Robbins 2004:20). Incidentally, establishing this as the 
authoritative test for neurovirulence was another example of important invisible infrastructure. 
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Sabin was one of several groups21 working in this way (Paul 1971; Robbins 2004). The Foundation 
provided him with $1.2m between 1953 and 1961, and $2m in total (Carter 1965:357; Chase 1982:303). 
In 1955, Sabin began a trial on inmates in Chillicothe Federal Prison in Ohio (Carter 1965:357; Smith 
1990:301). His vaccine was successful, but the Foundation saw little reason to take chances with a larger 
scale trial of an infectious live vaccine when Salk’s field trial had demonstrated efficacy the previous 
year. Large-scale trials of Sabin’s vaccine, and those of others, would be difficult to interpret because the 
Salk vaccine had been licensed and was being used widely.22 
 
There is clearly a path-dependency element to testing processes in vaccines (see also Blume 2005), but I 
would like to draw attention to a slightly different view. In the early experiments, poliomyelitis 
researchers faced a shortage of virus; Evans and Green, who were beaten to the Nobel Prize, faced 
shortage of human embryonic tissue; Hammon faced issues with a shortage of γ-globulin; whilst Sabin 
faced a shortage of people to test on. These cases represent a scarcity of testing resources. These 
resources are not fiscal, as is commonly emphasised in health and vaccine development literature (see for 
example, Lanjouw 2003; Archibugi and Bizzarri 2004; Barder 2005), but can be anything from the 
availability of monkeys, γ-globulin, primary isolates, to simply people as test subjects. They were 
unlikely to have been resolved by market failure approaches or policies that focussed on pecuniary issues 
alone; they require institutional co-ordination. 
 
The theory section also highlighted how the design of tests can be inherently constrained; such testability 
constraints can significantly impair the development of a trajectory, which, in this case, was testing for 
safety. The safety concerns in this trajectory extended beyond simply whether the virus in the vaccine was 
sufficiently attenuated to prevent it from causing disease. The major concern centred on its genetic 
stability and whether the live-attenuated virus would remain safely attenuated as it replicated. One of the 
advantages of the live vaccine was that after it passed through the intestines and was excreted by the 
vaccinee, it might then go on to confer immunity to someone else in the community. But the same 
advantage became a disadvantage for those who thought that, after several passages through community 
members, the altered vaccine strain might undergo progressive genetic changes such that it reaches a 
degree of virulence comparable to that of wild-type polioviruses. The success of the entire live approach 
                                                 
21 Other groups were led by Hilary Koprowski at the Wistar Institute, Herald Cox at Lederle Laboratories, and 
Joseph Melnick at Yale, all of whom tested their prototype live vaccines on institutionalised children (Chase 1982). 
22 For example, when, in 1959, Herald Cox had the opportunity to test his live vaccine in Florida, Sabin dismissed 
any excitement by pointing out that too many people had taken Salk vaccine for the test to mean anything (Carter 
1965:365). 
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therefore turned on proving that any cases of poliomyelitis was not caused by the vaccine reverting back 
to virulence after replication in the host. 
 
Melnick found that live vaccine virus passaged through children was sometimes virulent enough to 
paralyze monkeys (Carter 1965:381). This caused concern, but there was no way in which a test could 
show that a given case of poliomyelitis in humans had been caused by the live vaccine, even if the victim 
was struck by poliomyelitis shortly after taking a live vaccine. If virus recovered from the victim 
resembled the wild type, one could suppose that it had taken over the intestines, and driven away the 
vaccine virus, before causing the disease (wild type-induced disease). Alternatively, one could decide that 
the vaccine virus had changed to resemble the wild type and become virulent, thereby causing vaccine-
induced disease. Either way, testing primary isolates would not be able to prove a vaccine guilty. 
 
This was a serious testability constraint for this trajectory, it made designing a test for measuring live 
vaccine safety virtually impossible, never mind one that could be compared to the safety of a killed 
vaccine. In the absence of a test that could offer commensurable assurances of safety, the live vaccine 
continued to be perceived as being more risky. Closely tied with these perceptions were the assumptions 
of the vaccine designers, about the social context in which their designs would be used. Safety would 
become more readily observable as a systemic and subjective feature, as protagonists argued risks and 
benefits in different contexts. 
 
Due to the testability constraint surrounding safety, and the prior use of Salk’s vaccine, Sabin was forced 
to look abroad to conduct large-scale trials. In 1958, 200,000 children in a Singapore trial received 
Sabin’s live vaccine in an effort to curtail their epidemic (Paul 1971:454). By 1960, approximately 100 
million people in the former USSR and Eastern European countries had received the vaccine. By the end 
of the year enough evidence had been established to secure licensure in the US for Sabin’s live vaccine 
(Paul 1971:456). 
 
However, the continued existence of distinct trajectories depended on variation in health systems because 
a given vaccine-attribute could serve as a merit in one and as a drawback in another. As a Soviet public 
health official remarked, “Our inoculation program was a public-health measure, not a field trial. It was 
designed to suit our medical services. In attempting to inoculate a population the size of ours, could there 
be any serious confusion about whether to give away candy drops, when the alternative was injection 
requiring so much more apparatus and personnel? Our work with the Sabin vaccine must be viewed in 
terms of public health and not as a strictly controlled scientific experiment” (Carter 1965:359). Here, the 
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broader vaccine system and operational context comes into view as being decisive for the viability of a 
trajectory. 
 
If the Sabin vaccine could actually be shown to cause paralytic poliomyelitis, the finding would have 
been more significant for the US than for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was suffering poliomyelitis 
incidence rates of 94 per million (Carter 1965:363), much higher than that of the US, so any vaccine that 
could reduce that figure faster (because it could confer immunity to the non-vaccinated too) would be 
allowed the deficiency of a few vaccine-caused cases. It only represented one dimension in a broader set 
of criteria for the health system as a whole. 
 
The protagonists of each vaccine promoted their interests and preferred choice, but the way in which a 
vaccine’s attributes complemented existing infrastructure and health systems is likely to have had a 
greater influence in determining their adoption.23 The ensuing history of the changing relative merits and 
drawbacks of the Salk and Sabin vaccines has been astutely discussed elsewhere (Blume and Geesink 
2000; Blume and Lindner 2004; Blume 2005). It is worth noting, however, that as incidence of 
poliomyelitis decreased in the US over the next thirty years, the perception of risks and benefits changed 
and so the choice of vaccine changed too.24 In the next section, we turn our attention to vaccines’ 
technical systems and infrastructure, and how they affect continued vaccine innovation. 
 
3.5 The changing importance of thermostability in polio vaccines 
 
The development of a more thermostable poliomyelitis vaccine was made a high priority in 1991 by the 
Children’s Vaccine Initiative (CVI). The need for a thermostable vaccine emerged from the high-profile 
effort to eradicate poliomyelitis but the trajectory was stymied by the way the surrounding technological 
systems and infrastructure of immunisation evolved. A large proportion of the total cost and effort of 
                                                 
23 Cox was benefiting from an aggressive publicity campaign by Lederle touting its advantage of a single dose 
vaccine that still protected against all three strains (trivalent) (Carter 1965:365). Koprowski managed to trial his 
vaccine in 9 million people but had his vaccine turned down by the US government because it caused some lesions 
in monkeys (Paul 1971:454). Salk argued that his vaccine was effective and that they needed to wait longer, without 
introducing other vaccines, to see definitive results of an imperfect vaccination program. And Sabin’s appeared to be 
the newer more modern vaccine with which the public health service could have a second chance of executing a 
vaccination program of more complete coverage (Carter 1965:372). Sabin’s field trials in the Soviet Union were so 
effective they were doubted, and it took a report by Hortsmann, who was dispatched there by the WHO, to verify the 
standards and evidence (Paul 1971:455; Robbins 2004:20). 
24 ‘The conclusion [of a comparative analysis of live and killed vaccine] is heavily dependent on assumptions of risk 
of exposure to wild virus in the US. Major declines in risk of exposure… could alter the balance significantly’ 
(Hinman, Koplan et al. 1988:295). Despite the high costs of switching from live to killed vaccine, the Advisory 
Committee on Immunisation Practices recommended the change in 1996 and US vaccine policy delivered killed 
vaccine exclusively from 2000 onwards (Plotkin and Vidor 2004:1484). 
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immunisation programmes relate to the creation and maintenance of a cold chain to ensure that vaccines 
are kept in conditions where they can retain their potency until the point of final delivery.25 The cold 
chain system had to be geared up to cope with the least stable vaccine, which in the early 1990s was 
Sabin’s poliomyelitis vaccine (Lemon and Milstien 1994). 
 
As the movement towards poliomyelitis eradication gathered momentum, a ‘mopping up’ strategy was 
needed that relied on house-to-house administration of the vaccine to those at highest risk of poliomyelitis 
(Aylward et al. 2003). Eliminating the last 5% of cases has proved to be difficult because they often 
extended beyond the reach of the cold chain network and infrastructure. Workers’ mobility could be 
sharply increased in those hardest-to-reach areas if a thermostable vaccine could be developed, one that 
could be carried ‘in the pockets’ of workers for several days. 
 
To co-ordinate development efforts between a number of universities, vaccine institutes and commercial 
firms, a Product Development Group was established in the CVI (Lemon and Milstien 1994). Vaccine 
designers translated these qualitative attributes into quantitative goals, just as Hammon did when he 
demonstrated how much antibody was needed, just as Salk did when he showed how much inactivation 
was needed, and just as Sabin did when he showed how much attenuation was needed. The target was set 
to develop a vaccine that could withstand 37°C for 7 days, and retain a potency after such a thermal 
challenge of <0.5 log10 loss of titre of each of the 3 vaccine strains, with minimal change to viscosity 
(Milstien et al. 1997). 
 
By 1995, a new operational principle of thermostability had been established.26 But the principle was not 
developed further and the trajectory was aborted for three reasons. First, concern over scarcity of vaccine 
resources played a role in hindering the development, just as it had done for that of the Sabin and 
                                                 
25 The costs include capital outlays on refrigeration equipment but also expenditure on maintenance such as, 
procuring adequate fuel, ensuring reliable power supply, undertaking repair and management of the systems, and 
educating users of the dangers of over-refrigeration and vaccine freezing. Freezing can occur if vaccines are placed 
too closely to the walls of ice-lined refrigerators, or embedded in ice-packs that have not been allowed to melt a 
little. Taken together, these issues represented 8% of the total costs of immunising a child in parts of the developing 
world (WHO-EPI 1992). Freeze sensitive vaccines constituted over 31% of the US$439 million that UNICEF spent 
on all vaccines in 2005, and more than three quarters of all vaccine shipments were exposed to freezing temperatures 
at some point during distribution to health centres (Matthias, Robertson et al. 2007). 
26 Wu et al. (1995) showed that suspension of poliovirus in 87% deuterium oxide (D2O, known as heavy water) 
results in a significant increase in the stability of the virus when incubated at 37°C 42°C or 45°C. As noted in 
theory, science and technological practice can be quite independent from each other. It was not understood exactly 
why stability is improved - a scientific question - but what made this an operational principle is that the stabilisation 
effect was recognised as being reliable, predictable and useful; all important technical attributes. 
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Hammon vaccines. There were controls on the movement of heavy water isotopes, which is an essential 
component in the preparation of nuclear weapons. 
 
Second, developing a thermostable vaccine would not eliminate the need for cold chain systems because 
other essential vaccines would still need refrigeration. Improving the thermostability of a single vaccine 
would have had a negligible effect on reducing the overall cost of maintaining the cold chain 
infrastructure. 
 
Third, a different technology, the development of vaccine vial monitors (VVM), inhibited the 
development of thermostable vaccines because VVMs can indicate thermal inactivation for each 
individual vial helping to ensure quality and safety of vaccine delivery in weak infrastructure settings 
(Zweig 2006). Indeed VVMs are being used for evaluating how effective cold chains are, locating weak 
links and breaks in the cold chain, and identifying incidences of vaccine freezing (Zweig 2006). So, 
VVMs serve to strengthen the cold chain paradigm by monitoring the stability of heat-labile vaccines, 
thereby making the development of a thermostable vaccine a lesser priority. 
 
A thermostable polio vaccine was not an option that was easily available before 1950, before sufficient 
knowledge had been accumulated in clinical trials. But nor was the option easily available after 1991. 
Somewhere between 1950 and 1991, the window for an easily viable thermostable vaccine had opened 
and closed. 
4 Discussion 
 
The paper reiterates a call made nearly two decades ago to redress a ‘curious neglect’ of this process of 
knowledge accumulation through testing (Rosenberg 1994:14): 
 
‘The extent to which total R&D spending is dominated by the Development component 
calls attention to critical aspects of the manner in which technological knowledge grows. 
It is the essence of these technologies that their designs need undergo protracted periods 
of testing, redesign and modification, and retesting before their performance 
characteristics are well enough understood for them to be produced and sold in 
reasonable confidence. Although these expensive and time consuming development 
activities are typically not of great interest for their specific scientific content, the 
information so acquired is absolutely essential from an economic point of view. 
  21 
Performance characteristics of high-technology products simply cannot be accurately 
predicted without extensive testing… It cannot be emphasised enough that such 
information typically cannot be deduced from scientific principles.’ (Rosenberg 
1994:14). 
 
By 1950, some might have claimed that ‘the science was more or less there’.27 In contrast, this paper has 
traced the considerable technological knowledge accumulation that was needed in clinical contexts (rather 
than in laboratories and monkeys) before effective poliomyelitis vaccines could emerge. Little about these 
efforts could be described as inevitable; the testing regime involved firstly the deliberate manipulation of 
testing conditions through active experimental intervention, secondly, the development of new 
instruments and techniques, and thirdly, institutions playing a co-ordinating role to ensure shared rather 
than fragmented learning. 
 
4.1 Testing as experimental intervention 
 
The paper showed how testing conditions were manipulated in carefully controlled ways. It may have 
seemed like Hammon initially pursued passive testing as validation, testing whether a similar problem 
(measles) had a similar solution (serum injection), but the Hammon trajectory then showed signs of active 
‘testing as experimental intervention’ wherein conditions such as virus strains, viral doses, and the 
number of test subjects were all varied in the search for new effects and new theory. Throughout the 
process, safety shaped the approach. Indeed, the Hammon trajectory was pursued largely because it was a 
safe way of learning in humans, before turning to vaccine preparations containing virus. 
 
The decision to trial vaccines containing virus was seen as a calculated risk to safety. There was no safety 
test to ensure that Salk’s vaccine was completely killed. Similarly, it was impossible to design a safety 
test to see whether the Sabin vaccine causes poliomyelitis. However, unlike Salk’s trajectory, learning in 
Sabin’s trajectory was unable to forge ahead by carefully manipulating testing conditions because of the 
limited number of remaining vaccine volunteers to test on in the US in the wake of the Salk trials. These 
two testability barriers eventually forced live-vaccine development abroad. 
 
Testing in different countries revealed the more relative dimensions of the process. Eugenically-oriented 
medical ethics, which considered mentally and physically handicapped children and prisoners to be the 
                                                 
27 Some might claim that ‘the science’ was in place even earlier after Flexner demonstrated that monkeys surviving 
poliomyelitis could resist re-infection in 1910. Indeed, Flexner claimed that a vaccine would be ready in six months. 
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subjects of choice for medical experimentation, provided realistic testing conditions and eased safety 
concerns. We may be free of that particular aspect of the 1950s, but we are still laden with the subjective 
nature of safety amongst the rich and poor. The different decisions taken by the American and Soviet 
public health authorities reflected their interpretations of safety as well as their health systems’ 
requirements. 
 
We should therefore expect questions about future vaccine trials to centre on the ethical safety of their 
design, on how closely the testing conditions resemble the final operating environment and how well the 
vaccine will fit into surrounding health systems. This cannot be done on the basis of scientific deductions 
alone. Predictability and reliability in vaccines are established through repeated but carefully managed 
testing processes by exposing the vaccine to increasing levels of complexity in localised contexts. The 
extent of localisation in testing processes can be seen in a recent example where vaccine developers trying 
to offer a vaccine against ‘holiday stomach bugs’ requested clinical trial volunteers fly out to a holiday 
destination in an effort to simulate holiday behaviours and environments (Laurence 2009). 
 
4.2 Managing multiple vaccine trajectories 
 
The paper tracked multiple trajectories of vaccine development that were pursued in sequence and in 
parallel. Important technological knowledge was accumulated sequentially through a series of 
trajectrories: Hammon’s trajectory supported other trajectories based on different operational principles 
(Salk and Sabin’s active vaccines). It would be difficult to characterise the additional effort associated 
with the development of parallel trajectories as duplicated or wasted effort, particularly when the 
trajectories ended up offering their own distinct design advantages (and disadvantages) relative to 
different health systems. In fact, the paper shows that considerable institutional effort went into ensuring 
multiple paths of development remained open and comparable (see below on invisible infrastructure). 
Most of the vaccine designers tried to lock development efforts into their trajectory. The antagonism 
between the scientific orthodoxy, of which Sabin and Enders were part, and technological newcomers 
such as Salk and Weaver, might have mired all development efforts were it not for a mediating 
organisation.28 
                                                 
28 The patterns of institutional rewards and credit accorded to Salk and Sabin differed significantly suggesting that 
the pursuit of elegant science and urgent technology development are distinct endeavours with opposing ‘directions 
of fit’ (Nightingale 2014). Salk was a household name but his colleagues in the science community never afforded 
him the recognition and awards accrued to Sabin (Oshinsky 2005:270). ‘Many attributed the professional 
discrimination against Salk to the flamboyant backing of O’Connor and the resultant media frenzies, which were 
offensive to ‘pure scientists’’ (Katz 2004:187). Although Salk received the Congressional Gold Medal and other 
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The Foundation established mechanisms for mediating differences of opinion about efficacy, safety and 
when to test. One principal means for doing this was to strengthen the test by insisting on an 
unprecedented placebo arm, against the wishes of Salk who described it as a ‘fetish of orthodoxy’. 
Despite Salk’s efforts to negotiate otherwise, the Foundation insisted on doing this to make the clinical 
trails comparable with other trajectories. The result was that growth of knowledge was shared and 
accumulated (rather than fragmented). Another means was to set up an alternative Vaccine Advisory 
Committee that included a mix of skilled public health officials, scientists and medics, rather than 
scientists alone. This retained the sense of urgency and social purpose at the core of the Foundation, again 
encouraging the pursuit of multiple trajectories (to effectively hedge bets). 
 
4.3 Visible and invisible infrastructure 
 
The paper showed that, in order to accumulate technological knowledge, institutions needed to develop 
both visible and invisible infrastructure. Invisible infrastructure included the concerted effort to ensure 
qualitative attributes were interpreted into a set of shared quantitative design targets for the development 
of operational principles, as shown in all four of the vaccine trajectories. Hammon provided the all-
important ‘correlate for immunity’, showing that relatively little antibody was needed for efficacy. Salk 
demonstrated how much inactivation was needed and Sabin showed how much attenuation was needed. 
Later, tangible targets were set not only for thermostability, but also for temporal durability, potency, and 
viscosity. 
 
The Hammon trials also improved field-based capabilities for testing, again by developing important 
invisible infrastructure against which field tests could be evaluated. This was achieved at significant fixed 
cost through careful standardised trial designs, establishing critical viral infection doses, and developing 
various shared indices to measure qualities such as immunity and degrees of severity in symptoms. 
 
In terms of visible infrastructure, the Foundation strengthened its administrative capacity for coping with 
the logistics of large-scale immunisation and co-ordinating the supply of testing resources. It was 
important to ensure there would be volunteers to test on, γ-globulin to test with, and venues for 
immunisation (e.g. schools). Officials from health departments across the country and over 50,000 
                                                                                                                                                             
such public medals, Sabin was lauded by fellow scientists, elected to the National Academy of Sciences and 
embraced by virologists worldwide. 
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teachers provided local knowledge and support when the Foundation needed to navigate through the 
sensitive issue of using placebos in the trials for the first time. 
 
When a strong imperative to develop a thermostable poliomyelitis vaccine for the eradication effort 
emerged, it was not pursued successfully because the surrounding infrastructure and other technical 
systems had moved on. The need for cold chain systems would still remain due to the use of other 
vaccines that depended on refrigeration did not help. Moreover, new vaccine vial monitoring technologies 
reinforced the cold chain technological paradigm. Between 1950 and 1991, developing a thermostable 
vaccine had gone from being impossible to feasible to difficult. If a nascent trajectory becomes locked out 
by its surrounding technical system, it is not due to any inherent logic of the system, it is because the 
choice was made too late, after the window for making it had expired. 
 
4.4 Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The paper examined clinical trials as a strategic research site that has hitherto been relatively unexplored. 
Analysing vaccine development using testing regimes brings into focus different features of medical 
innovation. The case study has offered evidence for the two main claims of the paper. Firstly, clinical 
trials are not simply a verification tool; they are part of a learning process that is highly management 
intensive. This suggests there is a role for clinical research in medical innovation that extends well 
beyond regulating safety and efficacy. Secondly, multiple trajectories of product development can lead to 
different kinds of vaccine, each with attributes appropriate for different contexts. This suggests that 
product development must go hand-in-hand with product choice. 
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